

APPRAISAL IN THE RUSSIAN PRESS: THE CHARACTERISATION OF THE

UKRAINIAN LEADERS

LUDMILLA A'BECKETT

MONASH UNIVERSITY

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to uncover the means of inviting negative perceptions of Ukrainian leaders (the former President Yushchenko and Prime Minister Timoshenko) in the Russian press. Russian newspapers with the highest rates of circulation have provided the empirical base for this research. Appraisal theory has constituted the main theoretical framework. Other approaches such as conceptual metaphor theory, allusions and intertextual metaphors, semantic script theory of humour, irony research and a cognitive-stylistic approach to characterisation have been incorporated into the main framework, since the hidden evaluative devices include metaphors, allusions, irony and teasing, as well as narratives on the characters' disposition. The paper focuses on the techniques of foregrounding negative factors in heterogeneous discourse which include formulations of conditional acceptance of positive views and the attribution of value-laden opinions. Contextual cues and culture-based knowledge have been analysed as stimuli to the negative interpretations of ambivalent statements. Graded salience hypothesis and online concept construction have been used to substantiate negative preference in interpretation. Overall, the paper supports the claim that subtle ways of delivering evaluation have a strong impact on readers, since these devices are hard to recognise and dispute.

Keywords: *Invoked appraisal, irony, metaphor, allusions, humour, dialogic engagement, Russian public discourse*

1. Introduction

This paper deals with persuasive devices which invite and provoke negative judgements. Although linguists and the public in general are aware of the phenomenon of indirect evaluation (Brown and Levinson 1987; Van Dijk 1987; Sperber and Wilson 1995; Martin 2000; Culpeper 2001; and others), there have been hardly any extensive inventories of appraisal tools in Russian discourse (compare an overview in Budaev and Chudinov 2006) and in particular within a corpus of texts covering the same topic. In this paper, I investigate the means of evaluation that have been used in mass media coverage of events in Ukraine during and after the Orange Revolution.¹ Evaluation is generally defined as “the broad cover term for the expression of speaker’s or writer’s attitude or stance towards, viewpoint on, or feeling about the entities or propositions that he or she is talking about” (Hunston and Thomson 2000: 5). The use of ideological discourse in a linguistic investigation has advantages and disadvantages.² On the one hand, it has the advantage of displaying a variety of appraisal tools and of not being value-neutral. On the other hand, political discourse is an area of suspicion and prejudice. Russian linguists often prefer to deal with diachronic

¹ The Orange revolution was a series of political protests flared up throughout Ukraine in response to an attempt by the ruling elite to rig presidential elections. Eventually, the charismatic (at the time of the Revolution) opposition leader Victor Yushchenko with the support of his ally Yulia Timoshenko won the run-off and became the third legitimate President of independent Ukraine.

² The term ‘ideology’ is understood as ‘the basis of social representations shared by members of a group. This means that ideologies allow people, as group members, to organise the multitude of social beliefs about what is the case, good or bad, right or wrong, for them and to act accordingly (van Dijk 1998: 8).

perspectives of social cognition, e.g. Weiss (2007; 2008a; 2008b; 2009); or to examine evaluative resources across a broad range of themes, e.g. Baranov and Karaulov (1994) and others. Such an approach to data selection may be interpreted as an attempt to avoid affiliations with a particular ideological movement. The purpose of this paper and of evaluative studies in general, is not to challenge political views or argue about the validity of propositions, but to discuss the mechanisms of persuasion and interpretation on behalf of a putative reader.

2. Preliminaries

I am aware of many cases of opinion clashes on the Orange Revolution between migrants from Ukraine in the USA and Australia and their relatives still residing in Ukraine. One reason for this disagreement has been that the Russian mass media was the only source of information for migrants, while Ukrainian residents were able to monitor the events as they happened and access Ukrainian sources. Many migrants do not follow news bulletins in English as they live in areas where they are surrounded by speakers of Russian, communicating exclusively in Russian with their doctors, shop-assistants and pharmacists. My own views have changed drastically since I started questioning information from Russian newspapers and the NTV television channel, i.e. the Independent Russian News Corporation. This fact has prompted my investigation of evaluative devices used in the Russian mass media. I have looked at linguistic choices for description of events in Ukraine made by journalists and authors of opinion letters. I analysed these choices from the perspectives of appraisal theory (Martin 2000; Martin and White 2005), cognitive metaphor theory (Lakoff and Johnson 1980), studies of intertextual resources (Zinken 2003; Lennon 2004), humour research (Raskin 1985), cognitive semantics represented by graded salience hypothesis (Giora 2003) and on-line concept construction (Carston 2002).

The direction of this research has been defined following a pilot study of the data on hand. Tools of persuasion, which reverse positive propositions or are negative under the context conditions seem to have gained prominence in the discourse, and therefore, I have concentrated on contextualisation of negative attitudes. I have assumed that authors exercise more influence over readers when they engage the reader in analysis of opinions and lead the information recipients to a judgement position using subtle signs of authorial approval or disapproval. I have assumed that authorial leads and guidance for reading potentially ambiguous propositions are often more effective than a statement of authorial preferences in a direct and authoritarian manner, e.g. *they are traitors and criminals and should be despised*. There is a number of ways of guiding the reader across different value positions and formulations of attitudes. Traditionally, most such cryptic messages are considered within the category of figures of speech. Faint hints on authorial stance may alter overtly-expressed value positions in a proposition. The most frequently used tools of appraisal in the given corpus of texts are metaphors, allusions to historical characters, and the various formulations of dissociation from positive opinions, including humour. It should be noted that humour is rarely discussed as a means of tacit evaluation (Raskin 1985; Sannikov 2005; Bednarek 2006).

3. Categories of analysis

3.1 *Invoked evaluation*

It is nigh impossible to adhere to a single theoretical framework in analysing a variety of language resources. Therefore, my analysis includes several theoretical underpinnings. Appraisal theory provides a general framework for any study in evaluation. Bednarek (2006: 32) highlights the importance of appraisal theory for research of persuasive devices: *The contribution of appraisal theory to the study of evaluation can hardly be overestimated, since it provides the only systematic, detailed and elaborate framework of evaluative language.* One of the fundamental claims in appraisal theory relates to distinguishing between direct and indirect means of evaluation. The off-record (Brown and Levinson 1987) evaluation (Martin 2000; Martin and White 2005: 66-67) is presented in terms of invoked and provoked appraisal. Explicit evaluative markers, e.g. *good, bad, serious, and frivolous* represent inscribed evaluation. The invoked appraisal is implicit but triggered by the selection of facts, e.g. if you describe a person as putting at risk his or her own life while rescuing a child you invite or invoke a positive evaluation of this person. Descriptions of behavioural patterns (Culpeper 2001; Culpeper 2002) are generally value-laden. The authorial intent in such instances goes beyond the mere representation of factual information, as it also invites a certain attitude from the addressee. The provoked stance is triggered by the use of stereotypes, metaphors and emotional leads: for instance, the metaphor DISEASE generally provokes a negative attitude (A'Beckett 2006-2007: 225-228). There is a fine line between the invoked and provoked attitudes because factual information is often delivered in figurative statements. As Bednarek (2006: 31) argues:

In fact, the distinction [between inscribed and invoked evaluation–L.A.] is far from clear-cut and a cline between explicit and implicit evaluation is involved (White 2004), although the dichotomy is theoretically valid. Concerning evoked judgements, the 'central dilemma' (Martin 1995: 33) (of appraisal analysis) is the question of how much of the ideational meaning in a text is read as evoking judgements: any text can be read judgementally.

I admit some potential drawbacks with the adaptation of this terminology, however, since critical assessment of the linguistic theories is not the aim of this research, I focus on representations of these categories in text, i.e. the empirical aspects of invited appraisal.

3.2 *Manifestations of invited evaluation in the discourse*

I deal with several facets of invoked appraisal. First, the invited appraisal is manifest in narratives dedicated to the description of the characters' disposition (the characters are President Yushchenko and the Prime Minister Timoshenko). The characters' disposition includes highlighting habits, motivations and intentions. These topics reveal strong evaluative undercurrents (compare Culpeper 2002).

Second, the techniques of dissociating from positive opinions gained prominence in the discourse. Martin and White (2005) profile these techniques within the category of dialogic engagement. They define engagement as the play of voices around value-laden topics. Dialogic engagement includes sourcing opinions, formulations of countering, concurring, conceding and others. Texts from contemporary Russian press usually introduce multiple voices and value positions. Different opinions are expressed and heteroglossia (Bakhtin 1981; Martin and White 2005: 92) is created but authors often try to align readers with a particular

Revista Electrónica de Lingüística Aplicada (ISSN 1885-9089)

2009, Número 8, páginas 102-119

Recibido: 05/10/2009

Aceptación comunicada: 08/01/2010

stance which subsequently gains salience in the discourse. Along with explicit markers of distancing from positive opinions, such as *tem ne menea* 'however', authors may deploy various humorous genres such as irony, puns and teasing to flag their negative perception of the topics and characters.

Third, authors often use comparisons with characters that are not overtly negative. However, within the context of the Orange discourse (see section 4) they acquire negative status. Such comparisons are represented mainly by metaphors and allusions and they are traditional forms of rhetoric. Additional explanations of attended figurative devices have been provided below.

3.3 Humour

Humour is frequently used as a carrier of implicit attitude (Bednarek 2006: 37). Humour has various genres, such as irony, puns and teases. Irony is generally defined as a reversal or negation of an expressed proposition (Giora 2003; Sannikov 2005; Colston and Gibbs 2007). There are no explicit markers of negation in ironic statements. Interpretation of irony is triggered by context cues, and the reader's sense of appropriateness. Irony, similar to other forms of humour, is evoked by clashes between expressed and entailed scripts of the delivered proposition. Opposition of scripts is fundamental in defining the semantic script theory of humour (Raskin 1985; Attardo and Raskin 1991). Raskin (1985: 81) explains the script as follows. *The script is a large chunk of semantic information surrounding the word or evoked by it. The script is a cognitive structure internalised by the native speaker and it represents the native speaker's knowledge of a small part of the world.* Teases as a humorous genre, are triggered by a conflict between the victim's positive assumptions and expressed scripts. In Russian linguistics, all such instances are treated as ironic (Pioppel' 2000: 309). However, in teases clashes of perceptions do not result in a reversal of an expressed proposition. Colston and Gibbs (2007) draw a line between the reversal of propositions in irony and other jocular statements which retain and exaggerate the expressed claim. The collision of scripts, as a prerequisite for humour, often requires the reader to arrive at a tacit evaluation.

3.4 Metaphors and allusions

Metaphors and allusions can be defined among the means of provoking an attitude. A broad understanding of metaphor suggests treating of one entity in terms of another (Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Kovecses 2002; and others). Metaphors are conventionally considered as evaluative markers that have explanatory power, provoke attitudes and shape behavioural response (Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Lakoff 2004; Martin and White 2005; Musolff 2006; and others). In this paper, I focus primarily on those metaphors that evoke a negative attitude only in a given context. They have context-dependant disapproving overtones since these metaphors do not represent overtly negative terms, e.g. *brat'ia* 'brothers' (A'Beckett 2005; A'Beckett 2009b).

Metaphors include a subclass of culturally grounded concepts which are called intertextual metaphors or allusions (Lenon 2004: 2). Zinken (2003: 509) defines the intertextual metaphor:

There is, however, a type of imagination which does not project physical experience onto abstract domains, but seems to be rather culturally grounded, and which is very important in the linguistic

interpretation of the world. This type of imagination is realised in what I call intertextual metaphor... [Intertextual metaphors] are originated in semiotic experience: stereotypes, culturally salient texts, films, pieces of art, school knowledge and so forth.

Allusions are potentially ambiguous (A'Beckett 2009). Comparisons with the same historical figures can be accessed either as insults or compliments. For instance, Vlad Dracula for Romanians is a freedom-fighter and protector of Wallachia from the Ottoman Empire. In other cultures, Vlad Dracula is perceived as a sadistic ruler to whom are attributed tales of despicable atrocities and the phenomenon of vampirism. Different cultures prime non-identical semantic components within such concepts and, as a result, they arrive at different judgemental and ideational interpretations of allusive units. Understanding the phenomenon of the Zaporozhian Cossacks may yield a similar ambiguity (Reid 1996; Magocsi 1996).³ Potential ambiguity of cultural concepts can be explained by the application of graded salience theory (Giora 2003). A cultural variation of interpretation is a result of the discrepancy in salient meanings. Salient meanings are senses that are ready to be activated in any context. Otherwise context cues or pragmatic relevance (Sperber and Wilson 1995) influence the accessibility of the concept. On-line concept construction (Carston 2002; Carston 2006) primes some of the semantic components and places others at the background of comprehension. Cultural saliency (Giora) of the symbol and its contextual environment (Carston 2002; Carston 2006) affect the reading of the attitudes attached. Decoding the message as positive or negative, requires assessment of the compatibility of the prototype with its re-contextualisation. Blending a concept or script into a controversial context and the further engagement of the reader's interpretative skills is a commonly used device of persuasion in the Russian mass media.

3.5 Directions of analysis

In sum, my research targets expressions which acquire a negative rendition only by consideration of all contextual factors and the cultural background. Contextual factors may include the source of opinions (e.g. labelling social roles of the speakers), formulations of conditional acceptance of the proposition and humour. The cultural background reveals itself when salient components of names of historical characters and metaphor vehicles are accessed and preserved.

4. Data selection

Data selection may present a challenge for research in evaluation. I use my 'Orange discourse' for finding patterns of appraisal. The Orange discourse consists of approximately 80 publications on Ukrainian affairs selected from newspapers 'Argumenty i fakty' (AiF, lit. Arguments and Facts) and 'Komsomol'skaia pravda' (KP, lit. Komsomol's Truth) between September 2004 and December 2005 (A'Beckett 2008). Some sceptical voices may raise questions as to whether these newspapers are representative and whether they constitute valid grounds for research. In response, I argue that linguists are entitled to use any source for

³ Zaporozhian Cossacks are Ukrainian national heroes who represent ideals of equality, democracy and freedom. They were settlers in a borderline zone between the Islam and Christian world and were commonly engaged in brigandage or as mercenaries. The era of Cossackdom lasted roughly from the 16th to the 18th century and often is a subject of historical debates in Russia and Ukraine.

Revista Electrónica de Lingüística Aplicada (ISSN 1885-9089)

2009, Número 8, páginas 102-119

Recibido: 05/10/2009

Aceptación comunicada: 08/01/2010

extracting their language data. Bednarek (2006) draws one of her corpora from tabloids. However, in this case, the selection of sources cannot be criticised for being not representative. AiF and KP are top-rated Russian newspapers (by circulation). According to TNS Gallup Media, October 2008, AiF distribution has reached 8,108,500 readers. KP holds second position with 4,907,500 readers. The third-ranked ‘Zhizn’ and the forth-ranked ‘Moskovskiy komsomolets’ are far behind these leaders. But in fact, I have not been attracted by their ranking. Powerful search engines in their electronic sites influenced my preference (which is no longer the case with AiF). I used words *oranzhevaia revolyutsiya* ‘the Orange Revolution’, *oranzhevyi* ‘orange as an adjective’, *apel’sin* ‘orange as a noun’, *maidan* ‘a market square, i.e. the place of the Orange gathering’ and *Yushchenko* and *Timoshenko* for finding articles reflective of events in Ukraine. In this paper, I use a subcorpus which has been defined by keywords *Yushchenko* and *Timoshenko*. Despite the myth that Russian media consists of homogenous views, the corpus reveals heteroglossia.⁴ Use of keywords assisted in compiling controversial opinions on selected topics. Negative evaluation in the Orange discourse prevails but it was not so evident at the starting point of the analysis.

5. Irony

Distancing from evaluative stances has often been framed as an echoic presentation (Sperber and Wilson 1995). The echoic presentation is a reproduction or repetition of an estranged proposition by the authorial voice. Statements incorporating parallels of Timoshenko with Joan of Arc (A’Beckett 2009a; A’Beckett 2009b) are a good example of a positive label reversal. For instance, whenever Timoshenko is called “Joan of Arc of Ukraine”, her “selfish intentions” are also in focus. Formulations have been adopted in which there would be an explicit distancing of the authorial voice from positive categorization (Martin and White 2005: 113), e.g. *tak nazyvaemaia Zhanna d’Ark* ‘a so-called Joan of Arc’, *v narode ee velichayut Zhannoi d’Ark* ‘the people dignify her by the name of Joan of Arc’, *hrupkuyu Yuliyu Timoshenko okrestili Zhannoi d’Ark* ‘the fragile Yulia Timoshenko was baptized Joan of Arc’ etc. The appropriateness of the flattering parallel is frequently challenged through descriptions of Timoshenko as a spoiled and overindulged beauty. (1) and (9) illustrate the contradiction between the prototype of the national heroine and Timoshenko’s narcissism and vanity:

- (1) *Yuliya Timoshenko so svoei seksual'noi kosoi i vychurnymi tualetami ... baryshnia ochen' dazhe zhelannaia. Lichno menia pri vide ukrainskogo prem'era ... presleduiut naviazchivye fantazii (chego ne sluchaetsia pri vide premyera rossiiskogo) ... Ia diuzhe holodnyi neporochnyi muzhchina. A kakovo zhe energichnym ministram, kotoryh Yuliya sobiraet na soveshchaniia?! Mozhno podumat', ministry v etot moment razmyslhiaiat o blage i moshchi ukrainskogo gosudarstva, vdyhaia tonkie vzbuzhdayushchie aromaty frantsuzskih duhov s ee zdorovogo tochenogo tela ... Ne sekret, chto ukrainskaia prem'ersha zabotitsia o svoei pyshnoi krase i bol'shuiu chast' svoego vremeni provodit v kompanii lyubimyh portnyh, parikmaherov i massazhistov, s kotorymi obsuzhdaet ne tol'ko modu, no i tsenovuiu politiku.*
 ‘Yuliya Timoshenko with her sexy hairstyle and fancy dresses ... is a lady one lusts after much. Personally, I have to admit—I am haunted by obsessive fantasies ... when I see

⁴ Many linguists, Slavists and other scholars expressed their perception of the Russian discourse as a totality of texts with unanimous opinions.

the Ukrainian Prime Minister (which does not happen to me when I see a Russian Prime Minister)... I am a very frigid and chaste man. What about energetic ministers who are summoned by her for meetings?! It is hard to believe that ministers consider matters of importance and benefits for the Ukrainian state when they breathe in subtle exciting scents from her healthy and graceful body!?!... It is not a secret that the Ukrainian Prime Minister looks after her opulent beauty and spends most of her time in the company of her favourite tailors, hairdressers, masseurs and she discusses with them not only latest fashion but price-making policy as well.'

The basic proposition "They call Timoshenko Joan of Arc" flags an incorporated overstatement. Overstatement is an unintentional and unconscious expression of a proposition which is stronger than the evidence warrants (Gibbs 1994: 291). Other propositions can be inferred from the juxtaposition between the Timoshenko's behavioural patterns and the fate of Joan of Arc: "Timoshenko is not Joan of Arc", "she does not meet criteria ascribed to the category", and "the comparison is ridiculous." Observations on Timoshenko's character's disposition (Culpeper 2001: 116) in (1) and other fragments highlight the behavioural patterns of a spoiled and overindulged woman. The conceptual label 'Joan of Arc' conflicts with a narcissistic behaviour pattern. Similarities between Timoshenko and Joan of Arc have been tacitly disclaimed. Descriptions of Timoshenko's carnality and narcissistic habits plant doubts about her competence in political matters and heroic deeds.

The positive label 'Joan of Arc of Ukraine' gains the status of ironic marker and hyperbole in the Orange discourse. Hyperbole is a conscious expression of a proposition that is stronger than the evidence warrants (Gibbs 1994: 391). An ironic attitude has been derived from the hyperbolisation of the situation as a whole, its incongruity with day-to-day experience. My inventory of 'Joan of Arc' topics (A'Beckett 2009a) shows that this allusion in the Russian context, as applied to Hakamada (a right-wing female Russian politician of Japanese origin) or women suffering from a mental disorder and obsessions, usually awakens a negative and ironic response. Hyperbolisation of events in Ukraine and discussion of them in WAR terms are a frequently used context effect which focuses on ridiculous incongruity.⁵

- (2) *Timoshenko nosiat na shchitah spetsnaza. Ukrainskaia Zhanna d'Ark prikazyvaet soldatam revolyutsii vstat' v dve kolonny I 'vziat' pod ohranu administratsiyu.*
'Timoshenko has been carried in on shields by Special Forces. A Joan of Arc of Ukraine orders revolutionary soldiers to form two columns and "watch over the administration"'.
'

In (2) adherence to radical measures has been foregrounded as a commonality between Joan of Arc and Timoshenko. Although Timoshenko is usually portrayed as being far from the ascetic soldier, accusations of callousness and extremism may re-enforce some facets of the Joan of Arc script. Timoshenko has gained fame as an iron lady, the engine that propelled the Orange Revolution. The dialectics of positive and negative altogether with the mix of masculine and feminine traits are subtle.

⁵ The Orange Revolution was a series of peaceful protests. The Orange Revolution was famous for its non-violent response to the actions of the Ukrainian Government.

6. Distancing from positive opinions

Echoic representation of opinions expressed by Ukrainian people and a further disclaimer of these opinions is a common tool of persuasion in the Russian press. Positive opinions have been introduced but their validation has been missing. Voices of those who are in disagreement with the ‘echoic proposition’ lead the discussion.

- (3) *Iz Yushchenko i Timoshenko pytayutsia sdelat' obraz glashataev svobody. No komu i kakoi svobody ne hvatalo na Ukraine?Poniatno, chto delo idet ne ob abstraknyh demokraticeskikh idealah. “Kashtanovaia revolyutsiya” v Kieve–eto splanirovannyi udar... po Rossii.*
'There are attempts to present Yushchenko and Timoshenko as heralds of liberation. But who and what sort of freedom is lacking in Ukraine now? It is clear that it is not about abstract ideals of democracy. The “Chestnut Revolution” in Kiev is an organized strike against...Russia.'

Distancing from positive opinions on Yushchenko and Timoshenko has been strengthened through the leading question ‘Who and what sort of freedom is lacking in Ukraine now?’ The text operates under assumption that the reader will agree with the proposition that the people of Ukraine were free to choose what they want before the Orange Revolution.

A voice which initially agrees with the positive categorization is frequently introduced. However, some conditions and limitations of this positive view are provided in further segments of the text. Martin and White (2005) define these reluctant moves as the conceding concurrence which can be presented in the formulation *I accept that, however, [...]*.

- (4) *Ibo, kak zaiavil Sergei Markov, politolog...: “Storonniki Yushchenko”, da I sam on mne ochen' simpaticzny–sovremennye, evropeyski orientirovannye lyudi. No oni obmanuty temi, kto stoit za ih spinoi... Sozdateli etogo proekta –Z.Brzezinskii, M.Allbright...i drugie predstaviteli vostochno-evropeyskikh diaspor v SSHA...Ih tsel'–sdelat' Pol'shu etakim evroshefom nad Ukrainoi.*
'However, as Sergei Markov, a political commentator stated... I am very sympathetic toward “Yushchenko’s allies” and Yushchenko’s personality. They are people of modern and European mind style...But they are deceived by those who back them up...The creators of this project are Z. Brzezinski, M. Allbright..., and other agents acting on behalf of Eastern Europe in the USA. Their objective is to make Poland a European mentor for Ukraine...'

The view that the leaders of Orange Revolution are puppets of Western politicians and therefore, do not represent the interests of their nation has weakened sympathy toward Yushchenko and his allies (A'Beckett 2008). The suggested behavioural pattern reverses the positive evaluative markers.

(5) is a case of countering, where a positive opinion has clashed with expressed allegations.

- (5) *Naruchniki dlia Timoshenko. V. Yushchenko zaiavil, chto hotel by videt' prem'er-ministrom Yuliyu Timoshenko. No togda ey pridetsia ezdit' v Rossiyu, a zdes' po ney plachut naruchniki.*
'Handcuffs for Timoshenko. V. Yushchenko proclaimed that he would like Yuliya Timoshenko to be the Prime Minister. But then she needs to visit Russia. Albeit here handcuffs are crying out for her.'

The headline implies that Timoshenko is a criminal through the metonymy ‘handcuffs’ as an attribute of prisoners. It is quite interesting that the Yanukovich candidature for the President and Prime Minister has never been challenged on the same ground. Repeated jokes about Timoshenko’s alleged criminal activity seemed to be a convenient tool for playing down the topic of Yanukovich’s conviction and imprisonment for robbery and bodily injury.⁶ Formulations of conceding acceptance and countering have been often used as disclaimers of positive views.

7. Attribution of opinions

Within the framework of dialogic engagement, it is possible to source judgement, i.e. find representation of opinion holders. Negative claims supporting propositions (6, 7) have been made by experts: political analysts K. Bondarenko, V. Danilenko, S. Markov, S. Nikonov, and G. Pavlovsky (compare also the example 4). In (8) the author speaks on behalf of Ukrainians.

- (6) *Yushchenko I Timoshenko produkty nomenklaturnoi elity.*
‘Yushchenko and Timoshenko are products of the top nomenclatura.’
- (7) *Yushchenko—plod pol’skih intrig?*
‘Is Yushchenko a product of Polish intrigues?’
- (8) *Izbirateli vostoka i iuga nenavidiat Yushchenko.*
‘The electorate from the South and East [regions in Ukraine populated by Russian speakers] hate Yushchenko.’⁷

Positive opinion holders have been frequently described through the use of labels with negative connotations, e.g. *staika starushek* ‘a tiny flock of old ladies’, *buntovshchiki* ‘mutineers’, *zachinshchiki* ‘instigators’, *uchastniki voennyh deystviy v Afganistane i Chechne* ‘participants of military campaigns in Afghanistan and Chechnya’, *prostitutki* ‘prostitutes’ and others. Compare the following example:

- (9) *S Yu. Timoshenko (na kotoruyu vnov’ zavedeno ugovnoe delo) pered telekamerami marshiruyet staika starushek s plakatami “Yuliya! Ty nasha Zhanna d’Ark!”*
‘Yulia Timoshenko (against whom criminal charges have been raised again) and a flock of old ladies are marching with slogans “Yulia! You are our Joan of Arc!” in front of TV cameras.’

The weight of the opinions’ authorisation is unequal. Attribution of positive appraisal to unsympathetic characters is another common tool of persuasion.

8. Ambiguous allusions

A number of allusions, such as Joan of Arc of Ukraine and Orange/Gas Princess, have gained discourse systematicity. Along with these, I would also like to consider some one-off allusive

⁶ In 2000—2001 Yuliya Timoshenko, her husband and several employees of the Joint Energetic Systems of Ukraine were implicated in a criminal case connected to a series of economic crimes; and in 2004 Timoshenko was suspected of bribing judges but in 2005 charges against her were dropped.

⁷ Ironically, I and my Ukrainian family belong to the Eastern electorate in Ukraine.

units, e.g. *dama priyatnaia vo vseh otnosheniyah* ‘the lady who is pleasing in all respects’ (a quote from Gogol’s ‘Dead Souls’) and *hetman* ‘hetman, a Cossack general’. These allusions evoke memories of Ukrainian born celebrities who gained worldwide recognition as Russian artists such as writer Nikolai Gogol’ and artist Ilya Repin (see below).

Despite some publications accusing Yushchenko of being secretly subsidised by Russian tycoons, the media has stereotyped him as the embodiment of anti-Russian sentiments.⁸ An interesting example of the portrayal of Yushchenko as an aggressive war-monger who fights Russian authority, can be found in the headline (10).

- (10) *V. Yushchenko—Visit s getmanskoi bulavoi.*
‘V. Yushchenko—a visit with the mace of the Hetman.’

The statement may yield several interpretations. The literal reading suggests that Yushchenko bears the symbol of the Ukrainian Presidency, i.e. an imitation of a medieval weapon. The inauguration of the Ukrainian President includes the receiving of the mace. However, the literal reading clashes with the context ‘visit to Russia’. It is unlikely that Yushchenko would carry the mace during a trip. Therefore, the reading ‘Yushchenko is a legitimately elected head of the country, similar to a Hetman, Cossack General, and his power is certified by the possession of a *bulava* (mace)’ is likely to be computed. The word ‘mace’ carries a range of associations and is defined in the Russian Academic Dictionary as a polysemous word referring to an ancient weapon and an attribute of the power of the Hetman, the Ukrainian commander of the Cossacks, elected as chief governor of Ukraine during the 16th—17th centuries. At least two symbols are at play and lead to a broadening of the reading ‘Yushchenko is a legitimately elected President of Ukraine’: 1) the mace is a medieval weapon and a manifestation of aggressive intent; 2) the mace is a symbol of power, similar to a sceptre. If a sword is a conventional emblem of aggressive intent, a mace is a culture-specific conversion of the idea. Yushchenko’s hostile attitude toward the Russian ruling elite has been indicated both through the symbolic reference and description of his sentiments in the body of the text.

- (11) *Razumeetsia, [Yushchenko] ne pitaet osobyh druzheskikh chuvstv k russkomu rukovodstvu.*
‘It is clear that [Yushchenko] does not cherish very friendly feelings toward Russian leaders.’

The allusion to a Hetman, commander of Cossacks, strengthens the anti-Russian theme. If the reader holds the historical figure of Hetman Mazepa as a prototype for hetman, then an aversion to Yushchenko can be easily triggered. The Soviet Encyclopaedia and other sources presented the name Mazepa as a synonym for traitor. If the reader recovers the analogy with the image of Hetman Khmelnytsky, then the headline becomes a tease. Yushchenko’s intentions conflicts with the Khmelnytsky’s aspirations that led to the union of Ukraine with Russia. In the centre of Kiev, a large equestrian statue to hetman Khmelnytsky was erected. Khmelnytsky pointing his mace northward as an indication of the Ukrainian desire to stay forever with Russia. The conventional reading of this gesture suggests that Ukraine is an inseparable part of Russia. So-called anti-Russian inspirations of the Orange leaders clash with this symbol and invite an accusation of treason. The symbol ‘mace’ and ‘hetman’ also

⁸ This can be traced to as early as 2001. See *Ukraina—na pereput'e* (Ukraine at the crossroads) *AiF* No. 7, 2001.

provokes a parallel between the Orange Revolution and a negative perception of Ukrainian Cossackdom. The Orange Revolution may be interpreted as a riot of vagabonds and an outlet for violent thrill-seekers. Such views on Ukrainian Cossackdom are possible inferences from the reading of *Taras Bul'ba* by N. Gogol' and comprehension of *Reply of the Zaporozhian Cossacks to Sultan Mehmed IV of the Ottoman Empire* by I. Repin. In the absence of context cues supporting ideas of democratic choice and liberty in Ukraine, the stereotype of Ukrainian Cossacks as a gang of adventure-seekers and rough men is more likely to be activated. Ilya Repin, a Russian artist, born in Ukraine, in "Reply of the Zaporozhian Cossacks to Sultan Mehmed IV of the Ottoman Empire" portrayed a controversy in the characterisation of Ukrainian Cossacks. The collage illustrating the article "Who needs the chestnut revolution?" in *AiF* 48, 2004 used "Liberty Leading the People" by Eugene Delacroix as a foreground and "Reply of the Zaporozhian Cossacks to Sultan Mehmed IV of the Ottoman Empire" as a background. Half-draped Timoshenko represents the allegorical figure of Liberty. Rampant Ukrainian Cossacks seem to be enthused by Timoshenko's nudity and the prospect of showing off their might. The Liberty demonstrates its carnal, brutal and selfish underpinning. The conflated image reinforces the view that the Orange Revolution is an event which enabled rioters and vagabonds to let off steam.

Timoshenko's carnality was targeted in various publications. Newspapers could not resist assigning an exciting sex life to the attractive female public figure. A scene of Putin's seduction by Timoshenko has followed by an attention-grabbing description of the 'romantic' relationship between Timoshenko and the Georgian President Saakashvili. An allusion to a Gogol's character *Dama priyatnaia vo vseh otnosheniyah* 'Lady who is pleasing in all respects' from *Dead souls* re-emphasises Timoshenko's carnality and provinciality. 'The lady who is pleasing in all respect' is a euphemism for promiscuous women, invented by Gogol and exploited by some Russian websites offering intimate services. The allusions to the works of artists born in Ukraine but generally presented as Russian may provoke some belittling stances toward the Ukrainian nation.

The image of Yuliya Timoshenko as a vain and spoilt beauty has been supported by her nickname: the Orange Princess or the Gas Princess.⁹ The *Princess* script contains a set of diverse properties: some of them can trigger a positive reading but many features evoke a negative attitude. Fairy tales, e.g. *The Real Princess* by Hans Christian Andersen and paragons, e.g. Princess Diana, contributed to a variety of properties in the script. When Timoshenko is called a 'Princess', the reader has access to the encyclopaedic information on princesses which is compatible with Timoshenko's personality. Carston (2002: 347) argues that the positively laden properties of 'princess' consist of components: a princess has certain public duties to perform and is expected to behave in certain ways (to be civilized/polite/gracious/charming). Negative evaluations can be triggered by our knowledge that a princess expects to be treated with deference, and may be spoilt, indulged and used to ordering people around. The Russian press reinforces our negative perception of princess though it may also acknowledge the charm and grace of Timoshenko. The online concept construction (Carston 2002: Chapter 5; Carston 2006) explains why the configuration of the 'princess' script in the given circumstances yields a negative evaluation. The context cues from the Orange discourse supports the view of a vain and spoilt beauty (example 1). People

⁹ Timoshenko was the President of the company United Energy Systems of Ukraine and designed a new model of supplying the Ukrainian industry with energy sources.

who access information on Timoshenko from other sources, may prime other components from the 'princess' script: performing public duties, grace, charm and civilized manners.

In Section 5, it has been argued that the concept 'Joan of Arc of Ukraine' renders different interpretations for readers of the Russian newspapers and those who sincerely believe that Timoshenko can be compared to Joan of Arc. Moreover, the juxtaposition of Timoshenko and Joan of Arc sounds sarcastic if relations between Ukraine and Russia are compared to the relations between France and England during the Hundred Years War. Allusions display different facets depending on context cues and the reader's background knowledge. The understanding of allusions and their evaluative power is defined by the degree of salience of particular features attributed to the prototype and the compatibility of the salient traits with recurrent characterisations of the main referent. Context cues from the Orange discourse support negative stereotypes and reverse positive facets.

9. BROTHERS metaphor

The BROTHERS is a manifestation of the FAMILY conceptual metaphor which is widely used in different languages and cultures (Lakoff 2004; Musolff 2006). Two conceptual models of the FAMILY are at play in American discourse, i.e. STRICT PARENTS and NURTURING PARENTS (Lakoff 2004). The Russian metaphor vehicles allude to the STRICT PARENT model which requires fulfilment of duties and obligations among siblings (A'Beckett 2006-2007: 228; A'Beckett 2009b). In this paper, I focus on the contexts which have been retrieved through keyword application of the names of Orange leaders. Generally, two types of the FAMILY are triggered by BROTHERS in Russian discourse. The first one represents the Slavic union and is linked to the notion *Slavianskie bratia* 'Slavic brothers'. The idiom *Kiev- mat' gorodov russkikh* 'Kiev is a mother of Russian cities' and *matushka-Rus* 'Mother Russia' are manifestations of this concept. It is debatable who is the 'elder' or 'younger brother' in this FAMILY. For instance, following the historian Mikhailo Gruvshesky's, Reid (1996: 13) argues: "Russia...is not Ukraine's 'elder brother', but the other way round. Rather than calling Ukrainians 'Little Russians', perhaps Russians should be calling themselves 'Little Ukrainians'." The 'Slavic brothers' emphasizes common origin of the nations. On the other hand, those nations who decided to follow Soviet ideology automatically were assigned to the category of BROTHERS too. If some nations such as Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Afghanistan in 1979 experienced difficulties on the thorny way to building socialism, they received *bratskaia pomoshch'* 'fraternal assistance' (Mamardashvili 1990: 202). Therefore, the BROTHERS metaphor may allude either to SLAVIC BROTHERHOOD or the SOVIET FAMILY.

When Yushchenko is involved, the vehicle 'brothers' conveys mocking and teasing.

- (12) *Brat'ia po razumu: Saakashvili poteshil Yushchenko.*
'Spiritual brothers: Saakashvili amused Yushchenko.'
- (13) *Vot na bratskoi Ukraine pohoche, vser'yez reshili smenit' politicheskii tsvet svoey kozhi. Nel'zia skazat', chto...Yushchenko eto poshlo na pol'zu.*
'Our Ukrainian brothers [fraternal Ukraine], seem to make a serious decision on changing the colour of their political skin. It does not look like...Yushchenko has benefited from this.'

(12) seems to be outside the scope of the models SLAVIC or SOVIET FAMILY. The vehicle *bratia po razumu* lit. ‘brothers in spirit/ intelligence’ refers to aliens and extraterrestrial creatures. This vehicle addresses the similarity between Saakashvili and Yushchenko for their childish ‘amusements’. The context cue *poteshit* ‘to amuse’ and others indicate that their behavioural pattern deviates from the protocol and thus violates a HEAD OF THE STATE script. Saakashvili and Yushchenko created a weird family of child-like HEADS OF STATES within the boundaries of the former Soviet Union. The weird family traits can be applied to Georgians and Ukrainians if the metonymy HEADS OF STATE STAND FOR THEIR NATIONS is taken into account (Gibbs 1994). In the body of the same article the motif of renegade-brothers has been strengthened.

- (14) *Krome samih Gruzii I Ukrainy, v novuyu organizatsiyu voidut, veroiatno, Pol'sha I strany Baltii. To est' gosudarstva, ne ispytyvayushchie v poslednee vremia osoboi lyubvi k svoemu byvshemu 'starshemu bratu'.*
‘This new organization may include Poland and the Baltic Republics apart from the aforementioned Georgia and Ukraine. That means that it will comprise the states who do not feel special love toward their elder brother.’

The Soviet connections are at stake in examples (12, 14). The fragment (13) alludes to the Slavic brotherhood. This tease violates a social taboo on mocking a regrettable incident, such as the alleged Yushchenko’s poisoning. The poison that disfigured Yushchenko’s face was identified as dioxin which is orange. Therefore, the figurative meaning of ‘orange political skin’ correlates with the literal meaning of the colour of dioxin. The statement can be classified as a form of pun.

In many occasions, BROTHERS introduces teasing statements and reproach Ukrainians for breaking the union of Slavs or the post-Soviet community. Braiker (2001: 151) claims that ‘[t]easing, by definition, is hostile. Whenever a joke or tease is made at another’s expense, some degree of anger and aggression are the undercurrents.’

10. Discussion

10.1 Solidarity between readers and writers

Experiments of Bowers and Osborn (1964, 1966) (compare also Mio 1996) revealed that extremely intense language used for the purpose of convincing someone of a certain position often had the opposite effect on the receiver and created a ‘boomerang effect’. The selected passages from the contemporary Russian press do not incorporate overtly offensive expressions. Language of condemnation and sanctions has not been in a broad use. The negativity has been softened. A proximity between the reader and the writer has been created through the use of figurative language and purported expansion of the dialogic space. The writer appeals to the shrewd reader who can understand a cryptic message. The impact of figurative expressions is manifold: on one hand they create intimacy between a clever writer and a smart reader, on the other hand, all insinuations are mainly a product of the reader’s interpretation and the writer does not bear any responsibility for any extensive reading. The use of tropes allows authors to promote their position in a safe way. Metaphors, allusions, and humorous statements are open to unpredictable interpretation. As for value positions, both sides (positive and negative) have been accounted for, even if they were not equally

supported by the authorial voice. The tools of indirect appraisal invite readers to construct meanings and process further judgemental inferences.

10.2 Dissident voices

It has been shown above that both positive and negative opinions on the Orange leaders have been displayed in the discourse. Unfortunately, positive views have been outnumbered and dissolved among unflattering insinuations. The supportive voices have represented a background against which negative appraisals have been profiled. The effect of dialogic engagement (Martin and White 2005) could be re-cast in terms of the figure and the ground (see Langacker 1987; Langacker 1991; and Stockwell 2003 for details). Some positive views have been accepted as a starting point for negative spining. The denial of positive properties has been made through formulations such as *Ia dopuskayu, chto[...], no[...], Hotia[...], no vsye zhe[...]* ‘I accept that [...] but [...], Although [...] yet [...]’ and others (Martin and White 2005: 93-156). Conspicuous dissident voices have been occasionally given the opportunity to proclaim their position. Compare the next example:

- (15) *Zaimites' soboi! Ob'iasnite, rossiiane, zachem vy lezete so svoim ustavom v ukrainskij monastyr'. Ia uzh ne govoriu pro potoki propagandy, livsheisia s vashix gosudarstvennyx kanalov. Takoe oshchushchenie, chto v Rossii drugikh problem ne ostalos'.*
‘Mind your own business! You Russians, explain why do you poke your nose into Ukrainian people’s business? I do not mention the streams of propaganda that have been poured through your national channels. You try to make the impression that in Russia, problems do not exist.’

Unambiguous positive stances have been outside the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, I do not wish to give the impression that only negative opinions were welcomed in the Orange discourse.¹⁰

10.3 Keywords and recognition of textual patterns

I actively used the keyword technique (Scott and Tribble 2006) for finding reoccurring topics and contexts in the newspapers’ archives and in the compiled corpus of texts. One more application of the keyword technique could be envisaged, i.e. presentation of inferences from textual patterns in summarising keywords. For instance, abstraction across the patterns represented by (3, 4, 7, 8, 10, 11, and 14) reverberates in the inscribed evaluation ‘anti-Russian’ and ‘marionettes of the West’. Generalisation across (1, 9, and 12) leads to the labels “narcissist” and “self-indulgent” or “corrupt”; (2) yields “extremist”; and (6, 3) reverberates in “anti-democratic”. These evaluative markers in the Russian public discourse

¹⁰ Many facts that would yield support for Orange leaders have been left behind in the Russian press. For instance, Yushchenko made a successful career in banking. As a central banker, Yushchenko played an important part in the creation of Ukraine's national currency, the hryvnia, and the establishment of a modern regulatory system for commercial banking. He also successfully overcame a debilitating wave of hyperinflation. Timoshenko’s intelligence and amazing talent as public speaker have come to be appreciated by the people of Ukraine. In July 2005, the American magazine *Forbes* named Yulia Timoshenko as number three in its list of the 100 most powerful women of the world. She was dubbed as one of the most beautiful women to ever enter politics by *The Globe and Mail* in 2001. As an academic and economist, Yulia Timoshenko has published more than 50 articles. She has made a successful career in business and her transition from oligarch to reformer was believed by many to be both genuine and effective.

would not constitute primary concerns for those who participated in the Presidential Elections in Ukraine, 2004 and decided to support the Orange Coalition. They would prime the messages “response to the voters’ intimidation”, “rigged results of the elections”, “non-violent protests”, and “corruption in the Kuchma administration” with “chances for the opposition”. The change in the focus of the representation of a thematic social context is known as ‘frame shifting’ (Coulson 2001; Ritchie 2006).

11. Concluding remarks

In this paper, I have analysed rhetorical devices which lead the reader to a negative evaluation of Ukrainian leaders in the Russian discourse. Conflict of expressed and entailed concepts and propositions in the discourse have often resulted in humorous stances and disclaiming expressed propositions/unconscious assumptions. Several selected fragments from the discourse have illustrated the role of humour in playing down the opponents’ beliefs. The data also has illuminated the ambiguity resolution in interpretation of ambivalent concepts such as *princess* or *Cossack General*. The authorial position has been reconstructed through selection of contextual signals. The evaluative inferences have been drawn through the juxtaposition of the repetitive description of behavioural patterns and the labels of promulgated stereotypes. However, it is worthwhile noting that the luxury of discourse segmentation into fragments and components can be enjoyed only for research purposes. In a real life situation, various discourse markers are fused, interact with each other and may be processed simultaneously.

References

- A’Beckett, L. 2005. Connotative semantics of negative metaphors: Pragmatics of ambivalent attitude. Paper presented at the 9th International Pragmatics Conference, Riva del Garda, Italy, 10-15 July 2005 [the abstract available in *Abstracts of the 9th International Pragmatics Conference*. Riva del Garda: International Pragmatics Association, 2005, 9].
- A’Beckett, L. 2006-2007. The stance of Russian mass media on the Ukrainian Orange revolution. *Transcultural Studies: A Series in Interdisciplinary Research*. Vol. 2-3: 217-244.
- A’Beckett, L. 2008. Political myths on the Ukrainian Orange Revolution in Russian public discourse. *Monash University Linguistics Papers*, Vol.6 (1): 3-18.
- A’Beckett, L. 2009a. Onomastic allusions in the Russian Press: Multiple facets of the Russian Terminator. In S. Birzer, S. Finkelstein and M., Mendoza (eds.) *Proceedings of the Second International Perspectives on Slavistics Conference (Regensburg 2006)*, Die Welt der Slaven. Sammelbande 36, Munich: Verlag Otto Sagner: 3-16.
- A’Beckett, L. 2009b. The BROTHERS metaphor in Russian: a sign of alienation or of FAMILY unity? Paper presented at the 11th International Pragmatics conference, Melbourne, Australia, 12-17 July 2009 [the abstract available in ‘Abstracts of 11th International Pragmatics Conference’. Melbourne: International Pragmatics Association, 34].
- Attardo, S. and V. Raskin. 1991. Script theory revis(it)ed: Joke similarity and joke representation model. *Humor: The International Journal of Humor Research*. Vol. 4(3/4): 293-347.

Revista Electrónica de Lingüística Aplicada (ISSN 1885-9089)

2009, Número 8, páginas 102-119

Recibido: 05/10/2009

Aceptación comunicada: 08/01/2010

- Baranov, A. D. and N. Karaulov Yu. 1994. *Slovar' russkikh politicheskikh metaphor*. [Dictionary of Russian political metaphors]. Moscow: Pomovskiy i partniory. In Russian.
- Bednarek, M. A. 2006. *Evaluation in media discourse*. Continuum International Ltd.
- Bowers, J. W. 1964. Some correlates of language intensity. *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 50: 415–20.
- Bowers, J. W. and M. M. Osborn. 1966. Attitudinal effects of selected types of concluding metaphors in persuasive speeches. *Speech Monographs* 33: 147–55.
- Braiker, H. B. 2001. *The Disease to Please*. New York: McGraw Hill.
- Brown, P. and S. Levinson. 1987. *Politeness: Some Universals in Language Usage*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Budaev, E. V. and A. P. Chudinov. 2006. *Sovremennaiia politicheskaiia lingistika*. [Contemporary political linguistics]. Yekaterinburg: Ural'skiy Pedagogicheskiy Institut. In Russian.
- Carston, R. 2002. *Thoughts and Utterances: The Pragmatics of Explicit Communication*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Carston, R. 2006. Metaphor: Loose use and ad hoc concepts. Paper presented at *Mind, Language and Metaphor Euro Conference*, Granada, Spain, 28 April 2004.
- Colston, H.L. and R. W. Gibbs. 2007. A brief history of irony. In R. W. Gibbs and H. L. Colston (eds.) *Irony in language and thought*. New York: Lawrence Erlbaum. 3-25.
- Coulson, S. 2001. *Semantic leaps: Frame-shifting and conceptual blending in meaning construction*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Culpeper, J. 2001. *Language and characterisation: people in plays and other texts*. Harlow: Pierson Education.
- Culpeper, J. 2002. A cognitive stylistics approach to categorisation. In E. Semino and J. Culpeper (eds.) *Cognitive stylistics: Language and cognition in text analysis*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. 251-279.
- Gibbs, R. W. 1994. *The poetics of mind: figurative thought, language and understanding*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Giora, R. 2003. *On our mind: Salience, context and figurative language*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hunston, S. and G. Thompson (eds.) 2000. *Evaluation in text*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kovecses, Z. 2002. *Metaphor. A Practical introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Lakoff, G. 2004. *Don't think of an elephant!: Progressive values and the framing wars: The progressive guide to action*. White River Junction, Vt.: Chelsea Green Pub. Co.
- Lakoff, G. and M. Johnson. 1980. *Metaphors we live by*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- Langacker, R. W. 1987. *Foundations in cognitive grammar, Vol.1: Theoretical prerequisites*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Langacker, R. W. 1991. *Foundations in Cognitive Grammar, Vol. II: Descriptive application*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Lennon, P. 2004. *Allusions in the press: An applied linguistic study*. Berlin, New York: Mouton de Gruyter.
- Magocsi, P. R. 1996. *A History of Ukraine*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Mamardashvili, M. 1990. *Kak ia ponimayu filosofiuyu*. [How I understand philosophy]. Moscow: Progress. In Russian.

- Martin, J. R. 1995. Reading positions/positioning readers: Judgement in English. *Prospect: a Journal of Australian TESOL* 10: 27-37.
- Martin, J. R. 2000. Beyond exchange: Appraisal systems in English. In S. Hunston and G. Thompson (eds.) *Evaluation in text*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 142-75.
- Martin, J. R. and P. White. 2005. *The language of evaluation: Appraisal in English*. Palgrave: New York.
- Mio, J. S. 1996. Metaphor, politics, and persuasion. In J. F. Mio and A. N. Katz (eds.) *Metaphor: Implications and applications*. Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum. 127-47.
- Musolff, A. 2006. 'Metaphor scenarios in public discourse'. *Metaphor and symbol*, 21(1): 23-38
- Pioppel', L. 2000. Figura umolchaniya v politicheskom diskurse. [A figure of aposiopesis in political discourse]. In N. D. Arutyunova, T. E. Ianko and N. K. Riabtseva (eds.) 2000. *Iazyki etiki*. [Languages of ethics]. Moscow: Iazyki russkoi kul'tury. 306-313. In Russian.
- Raskin, V. 1985. *Semantic mechanisms of humour*. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
- Russian academic dictionary* [Slovar' russkogo yazyka] in 4 volumes. (1981). Vol.1. Moscow: Russkij Yazyk. In Russian.
- Reid, A. 1996. *Borderland: a journey through the history of Ukraine*. London: Weidenfield and Nicolson.
- Ritchie, L. D. 2006. *Context and connection in metaphor*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- Sannikov, V. Z. 2005. Ob istorii i sovremennom sostoianii russkoi yazykovoii igry. [On history and present state of the Russian language game]. *Voprosy yazykoznaniiya* [Problems in linguistics] 4: 3-20. In Russian.
- Scott, M., and C. Tribble. 2006. *Textual patterns: key words and corpus analysis in language education*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins
- Sperber, D. and D. Wilson. 1986/1995. *Relevance: Communication and cognition*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Stockwell, P. 2003. Surreal figures. In J. Gavins and G. Steen (eds.) *Cognitive poetics in practice*. London: Routledge. 13-27.
- Van Dijk, T. A. 1987. *Communicating racism: Ethnic prejudice in thought and talk*. Newbury Park: Sage.
- Van Dijk, T. A. 1988. *Ideology: A multidisciplinary approach*. London: Sage.
- Weiss, D. 2007. Stalinistskiy i natsional-sotsialisticheskiy diskursy propagandy: sravnenie v pervom priblizhenii [The Stalinist and National-Socialist discourses of propaganda: a primary approach in comparison]. *Politicheskaiia lingvistika* [Political linguistics] 2007, No 3: 34-60. In Russian.
- Weiss, D. 2008a. Zhivotnye v sovetskoi propagande' (Animals in the Soviet propaganda). *Politicheskaiia lingvistika* 2008, No 2, [accessed at [http://journals.uspu.ru/ling5\(25\)2008](http://journals.uspu.ru/ling5(25)2008)] . In Russian.
- Weiss, D. 2008b. Parazity, padal', musor. Obraz vraga v sovetskoi propagande. [Parasites, carrion, trash. The image of enemy in the Soviet propaganda. *Politicheskaiia lingvistika* [Political linguistics] 2008, No 1: 16-22. In Russian.
- Weiss, D. 2009. Zhivotnye v sovetskoi propagande (Animals in the Soviet propaganda). Part 2. *Politicheskaiia lingvistika* [Political linguistics] 2009, No 1: 39-46. In Russian.
- Zinken, Z. 2003. Ideological imagination: Intertextual and correlation metaphors in political discourse. *Discourse and Society*, Vol. 14(4): 507-23.

Appendix

List of cited publications

- Brat'ia po razumu: Saakashvili poteshil Yushchenko* [Spiritual brotherhood: Saakashvili amused Yushchenko], *AiF* No. 33, 2005
- Budet li v Rossii oranzhevaia revolyutsiia?* [Will we have the Orange Revolution in Russia?], *AiF* No. 11, 2005.
- Denezhnoe nedovol'stvo voennosluzhashchih.* [Monetary dissatisfaction of the military personnel], *AiF* No. 8, 2005.
- Komu nuzhna "kashtanovaia revoliutsiia"?* [Who needs the Chestnut Revolution?], *AiF* No. 48, 2004.
- "*My syuda priehali ne v biryul'ki igrat'...*" ['We are not here to waste our time on trifles/ play spillikins...'], *Komsomol'skaia pravda*, 24.11.2004.
- Nakanune "revoliutsii kuvald"?* [At the dawn of the "Revolution of sledge-hammers"?], *AiF* No. 51, 2004.
- Naruchniki dlia Timoshenko*, [Handcuffs for Timoshenko], *AiF* No. 3, 2005.
- Oligarhi: BAB postroil domik v Kieve*, [Oligarchs: BAB [Boris Abramovich Berezovsky] built up a house in Kiev]. *AiF* No. 5, 2005.
- "*Oranzhevaia*" *Ukraina – netu miasa, net benzina!* [The Orange Ukraine—it has no the meat, neither petrol!], *Komsomol'skaia pravda*, 18.06.2005.
- Salo v apel'sinax, ili Kuda dreifuet Ukraina?* [The fat in oranges or where is Ukraine drifting to?], *AiF* No. 49, 2004.
- SNG: Slyet premyerov.* [CIS: Meeting of Prime Ministers], *AiF* No. 23, 2005.
- Ukraina, kotoruyu my poteriali ili obreli.* [Ukraine: What we have lost or what we have found], *Komsomol'skaia pravda*, 29.12.2004
- Ukrainu raskalyvayut popolam?* [Has Ukraine being broken in half?], *Komsomol'skaia pravda* 22.11.2004
- Ukraina: Sudnyi den'. Dva presidenta v samyi raz?* [Ukraine: The Judgment Day. Welcome to two Presidents?], *AiF* No 46, 2004
- Ukraina: Yushchenko—plod pol'skix intrig?* [Ukraine: Yushchenko—a Product of Polish intrigues?], *AiF* No. 44, 2004.
- V oranzhevyi tsvet Kiev raskrasili my?* [Have we painted Kiev in the color orange?], *Komsomol'skaya pravda*, 9.12.2004.
- V. Putin: dva dnia—dve stolitsy* [V. Putin: two days—two capitals], *AiF* No. 12, 2005.
- V. Yushchenko – Vizit s getmanskoi bulavoi.* [V. Yushchenko—the visit with the mace of hetman], *AiF* No. 4, 2005.
- Voprosy s gazovym dushkom.* [Questions with gas tinge], *AiF* No 51, 2005.
- Yulia krasa dlinnaia kosa* [Yulia – a pretty women with long plait], *Komsomol'skaia pravda*, 26.12.2005
- Yu. Timoshenko: "Ya—stal'naya, hotia mne i bol'no"* [Yu Timoshenko: 'I am made of iron though I still feel pain'], *AiF* No. 39, 2005.
- Zaimites' soboi!* [Mind your own business!], *AiF* No. 48, 2004.