Acceso usuarios
Enrique Villanueva
Intentionality is a classical topic in the philosophy of mind. In this article the author deals with Dennett's recent analysis of the concept and puts into context the main points of Dennett's view on the subject. Intentionality has been frequently understood as a "deep" and essential property of beings such as persons, but not of artifacts endowed with the so called artificial intelligence. Dennett's endeavor to shift the analysis of intentionality from this romantic outlook to one wherein successful attribution of intentionality is the problem to be solved is developed through the scrutiny of subjects such as reason and evolution, belief and interpretation, causal transmission and mental content, realism and objectivity, etc.
Dennett's stance regarding intentionality turns out to be an open one. Intentional attribution should be assessed on the grounds of its explanatory utility as a strategy that enables us, -at least up to a certain degree- to predict the conduct of "intentional" agents. The author ends up by asking some relevant questions that pose some of the pending problems about the topic of intentionality.
