Acceso usuarios
Luis Vega Reñón 
The philosophical and rather idiosyncratic rationale of Wittgenstein's thought's evolution with regard to logic and mathematics keeps him away from the stream of contemporaneous mathematical logic. In this respect Wittgenstein looks like an "outsider". This self -displacement means, in a weak sense, a reluctance of Wittgenstein's philosophical activity to be reduced to any philosophical "ism" about those matters. But some Wittgenstein's typical attitudes and statement entail a strong sense, to such a point that Wittgenstein puts himself aside of the very developments and new views opened in logic, specially from the 30s on. These move Wittgenstein away from the current research in logic and metamathematics (i.e. in the modern methodology of deductive sciences) underlies certain misunderstandings and brings about the irrelevance of his remarks on rules, meaning and proof, in today's logical and metatheoretic (proof- and model- theoretic) handling of these topics' -even in spite of some rather fortuitous resemblances and of Wittgenstein's widespread influence on the philosophy of language and pragmatics of argumentation.
