Acceso usuarios
Lorenzo Peña has in several books developed an ontological approach which, by implementing the notions of both degrees and aspects of existence, copes with well-known difficulties about existential commitments, thus offering an alternative to currently fashionable Meinongian accounts while keeping in a way closer to the standard (Quinean) orthodoxy. The paper discusses that approach and claims that despite its advantages it is bound to somehow espouse, at least in the metatheory, the very same classical-logic assumptions it tries to undermine, such as on/off view of truth and existence. If Lorenzo Peña's theory advocating degrees of truth is only up to a point true, the classical approach has not been entirely overcome. But if the theory is completely true, that shows that, at least for us, owing perhaps to our own species-specific characteristics, truth needs to be regarded as an all-or-nothing matter.
